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Abstract 
 
CST has undertaken several studies of the methods available for the launch of GEMINI-1, a 400 kg test satellite 
being built by Surrey Satellite Technologies Ltd. (SSTL) in collaboration with Nigeria, for the BNSC which 
have included it their MOSAIC UK small satellite programme. 
 
The results of these studies with cost comparisons will be presented in the paper. It will be shown that the 
cost/kg of placing a mini satellite into GEO need not be any more than that for larger satellites and in some 
special circumstances may be significantly cheaper. This interesting result could have far reaching consequences 
for the communication marketplace and technologies. It could also encourage research and development, 
innovation and independence. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years the capabilities of small satellites have 
improved to such an extent that GEO communication 
satellite payloads of less than 500 kg are now being 
seriously studied and developed world-wide. To 
launch such satellites inexpensively, i.e. at or below 
the cost/kg of ‘conventional’ large GEO comsats, 
unless this is done in a large cluster, is apparently 
impossible. New players are looking to using GEO 
mini-satellites for various reasons. In the field of 
communications, some of these reasons are: 
• The high level entry costs for using 
‘conventional’ large satellites, which are getting 
larger anyway 
• Economical experimentation and technology 
demonstration 
• Stop-gap regulatory compliance, phased roll-out 
of capability at a particular slot 
• Tests of markets or small ‘niche’ markets 
• For developing countries: independence and 
prestige with improvement of technology base. 
 
The last factor is addressed for all classes and orbits 
of small satellites (from 6 kg to 400 kg so far), 
particularly remote sensing, by Surrey Satellite 
Technology Ltd (SSTL) for which CST procures 
launches in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) at the 
economical prices which are essential for most small 
satellite projects. The FSU remains the best overall 
source of launches for small satellites [1]. 
 
Until standard definitions are universally adopted 
CST uses the following: picosat<10 kg, microsat<100 
kg, minisat<500 kg, small satellite<1000 kg. 
 
2. Methods 
 
There are at least four distinct potential methods 
available uniquely to mini satellites which are 
relatively inexpensive to use. These are: 
 
1. Dedicated Small Launchers such as Soyuz+Fregat, 
Tsyklon-4 (if this is produced), Angara [1, 2] and 
Athena 2 (with PAMs) or converted missiles with 
additional stages. 
 
2. Ion Propulsion 
Khrunichev is developing a satellite bus with ion 
propulsion capacity capable of reaching GEO from a 
ROKOT launch called ‘Yacht’. 
 
3. Cluster Launching 
Any of the extant launchers could be adapted to do 
this. Proton already does cluster launchers to HEO of 
GLONASS satellites and new EXPRESS buses are 
being developed which will be cluster launched to 
GEO. 
 
4. Piggy-backing 
Ariane-5 can do this to GTO but this orbit is not 
suitable for very small satellites for which the extra 
propulsion burden to get to GEO is proportionately 
greater. Proton can piggy-back a satellite in the mini-
satellite class directly into GEO at economical cost. 
 
CST has made an agreement with the Russian 
government body CGSI (Centre for Ground Space 
Infrastructure Operations) to enable it to arrange the 
launch of mini-satellites of the GEMINI class to GEO 
using methods 1, 3 and 4. 
 
Since method 2 is actually a way of producing a small 
dedicated GEO launcher from a converted missile it 
will be dealt with, with method 1, under the title of 
small dedicated launchers, below. 
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3. Piggy Back and Cluster Launches 
 
Methods 3 and 4 have been described in [1] for LEO 
satellites. For GEO/GTO missions, opportunities are 
rare and sometimes difficult to arrange, but the 
potential savings make the exercise worthwhile. 
Direct insertion into GEO with non-FSU launchers is 
rare since nearly all insert satellites into GTO only 
(and the large satellites have the propulsion capability 
to ‘do the rest’) and the FSU method of using the 
satellites as platforms [2] is impossible due to 
insurance/risk problems on commercial missions and 
the satellite construction methods. Perhaps a crucial 
factor is that in the rest of the world (ROW) outside 
the FSU it is traditional to use every available gram of 
launcher capacity, e.g. by loading extra propellant on 
to the satellite to increase its available lifetime, thus 
leaving no space at all for ‘parasitic’ payloads. 
 
Because of the consequences of Stalin paranoia (not 
because of the lack of any innate ability) electronics 
in the FSU was retarded. Thus all FSU satellite 
designs had much lower lifetimes than that usual  in 
the ‘West’. Launchers, however, being related to 
missile technology were well advanced, (it is no co-
incidence that US launching companies are buying 
Russian/Ukrainian launcher technology) designed for 
long production runs and consequently cheap. In 
addition to this (from a land of theoretical masters) a 
launcher is regarded as just part of an overall system 
and it is this, therefore, which is optimally designed. 
As a consequence, horizontal integration and efficient 
pad design leads to great efficiency of use. 
 
Therefore, Soviet launchers were often launched with 
very light payloads compaired to their real capacity, it 
being more economical to off-load propellant than 
build payloads of non-standard design. Even now, 
after 12 years, Russia and Ukraine inherit the 
shadows of this (not bad) philosophy. 
 
Thus piggy-backing is possible and is likely to remain 
possible on FSU GEO national launching missions, 
i.e. for Proton, Zenit-3 from Baikonur, Soyuz-Fregat, 
Angara, etc. 
 
Piggy-backing directly from an attachment on 
‘Western’ satellites is impossible because of the 
dedicated (and delicate) nature of their design as well 
as the other factors mentioned above. However, 
because of the above and other factors affecting their 
design also mentioned, FSU satellites are more 
‘agricultural’ (British Aerospace description on first 
examining one) and the deployment of small satellites 
direct from their structure has actually been the 
commonest method used in the FSU for piggy-
backing (as opposed to ‘cluster launching’ – see 
later). CST’s first piggy-back launch arrangement in 
1995 for Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. was, in 
fact, direct from the Ukrainian radar ocean 
surveillance satellite ‘Sich’. [CST and SSTL were 
impressed that several ‘take-off’ points were offered 
from the structure of ‘Sich’.] 
 
In spite of all of the above, it is unlikely that piggy-
back insertions to GEO will be available directly from 
an FSU main satellite as these are rapidly improving 
in both structural efficiency, lifetimes and 
performance. However, by attaching to and deploying  
from the relevant upper stage such as Blok-D 
variants, Breeze variants or, possibly, Fregat variants, 
piggy-backing to GEO is possible and economical 
with the additional advantage of independent 
deployment once the main satellite is placed. A 
proposal for this method of deployment for GEMINI-
1 is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Upper stage unit with S/C and upper stage 
arrangement for piggy-back launch (CST). 
 
In piggy-backing, the main criterion is that the piggy-
back satellite does not interfere with, or risk in any 
way, the primary payload. Also, in the purest case, it 
must comply with any delays, cancellations, in 
timescale or orbit, of the primary satellite. While 
dedicated launches are the alternative at a price, 
cluster launches may present a more effective 
solution. However, the satellites are not always ‘of 
equal rank’, with one small satellite being prime. 
Dnepr and other small launcher LEO missions tend to 
follow this pattern. However, most HEO and potential 
GEO cluster launches would seem to have a ‘pure 
equality’. An example of this is a proposed alternative 
cluster launch method for GEMINI-1 which is shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Piggy-backing in various guises has existed in the 
Soviet Union from 1972 when the French SRET-1 
was injected by the ‘Molniya’ launcher. Interestingly, 
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in the SU and until recently in FSU no payloads have 
been separated directly from the top stage of a launch 
vehicle. All were attached to and separated from the 
various satellites which were the primary payloads. A 
popular choice for sun-synchronous missions was the 
‘Resource’ satellite launched with a Zenit-2 from 
Baikonur, always with plenty of spare mass capability 
[1, 2]. 
 
Fig. 2. “Packed” arrangement of S/C inside upper unit 
of Proton for a cluster launch (CST). 
 
Meanwhile, in the ‘West’, NASA has occasionally 
offered ‘free’ piggy-backs for guests (e.g. SSTL’s 
first two missions), but perhaps the most rational and 
significant development was the ASAP (Ariane 
Secondary Auxiliary Payload) platform from 
Arianespace (with some encouragement from SSTL 
who launched their next satellites with it to SSO with 
SPOT missions). This, as its name describes, allows 
piggy-backs to be launched without interference with 
the main payload. The ASAP facility was carried over 
from Ariane-4 to Ariane-5 and the maximum 
dimensions and mass allowed (120 kg) has given rise 
to a new ‘standard’ mini-satellite type and several 
projects are underway (in Europe at least) for 
launching satellites of this class to GTO using an 
ASAP platform on Ariane-5. 
 
However, there is a fairly obvious problem with 
placing a 120 kg satellite in GEO via GTO, which is 
propulsion/propellant mass. In fact, true mini 
satellites in GEO are pushing the design margin in 
several directions, not just mass and power 
requirements/solar panel size. [Russian projects 
Dialogue, Ruslan-MM and Express AK are, as a 
consequence in the ‘small’ rather than ‘mini’ class. It 
remains to be seen whether small communication 
satellites of 120 kg launched via GTO are viable at 
all. Aware of this, CST is attempting to produce 
launch solutions to GEO by piggy-back (400 kg max) 
or cluster (800 kg max) methods. Certainly the 
problems for the 120 kg class could be considerably 
eased if they could be launched to GEO in pairs or 
triplets (probably the most economic option). 
 
The target price for CST’s launch solutions is 
$20, 000 per kg, but this specific cost will rise for 
non-optimum masses or sizes. 
 
4. Dedicated Small Launchers 
 
These would seem to be thin on the ground in the 
West with the Athena-2 with PAMs being a possible 
candidate (price to be established), but in the FSU 
there are at least 6 possible candidates in the near 
term (prices also to be established). 
 
Soyuz+Fregat 
 
At around $30 m US from Starsem for 2.0 + tonnes to 
GTO from Kourou this launcher is a little on the large 
and therefore expensive side for small satellites, but 
may be within economical range for minisats as part 
of shared or clustered payloads. First Starsem launch 
from Kourou is currently scheduled for 2006. 
 
In certain circumstances shared launches with 
Russian national missions may be possible from 
Baikonur. It is difficult at this stage to say which will 
be better from an auxiliary payload point of view. 
 
Tsyklon 4 
 
A project by Ukrainian/Italian/Brazilian organisations 
is persevering (limited mainly by funding difficulties) 
to establish a launch base for Tsyklon-4 at the 
Alcantara range which is very close to the equator. If 
successful, the result could be a very credible 
economical (around $20 million US) light GEO 
launcher. There are many ways in which the Tsyklon-
3, a very reliable and well proven launcher, could be 
stretched. The new launcher (Figure 3) will have 
increased performance of the engines, a modern 
control system and the head fairing with an increased 
volume of the payload compartment. It will provide 
the possibility to inject a satellite or a group of 
satellites of up to 5500 kg to an equatorial orbit of 
500 km or a satellite of 1800 kg to GTO. The range of 
launch azimuth will be from 0 to 115o. ‘Tsyklon-4’ 
differs from the previous ‘Tsyklon –3’ as follows: 
• a new third stage will have treble the amount of 
propellant and will have a high weight 
perfection that will increase the power of the 
launcher and reduce the longitudinal g-load 
down to 6g, 
• multiple operation of the modernised 
propulsion plant of the third stage (up to 3…5 
starts) will provide new possibilities, including 
group launches. 
• a new high-precision control system with GPS 
navigation will be used, 
• a new head fairing with an increased payload 
volume and satellite environment control will 
be used. 
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Fig. 3. The Tsyklon-4 launch vehicle (artist impression, Yuzhnoye). 
 
 
Angara Variants 
The ‘Angara’ name (the name of a Siberian River) 
was given initially to the future Russian heavy 
launcher for which development the Rosaviakosmos 
announced a competition in 1994. This competition 
was won by the Khrunichev Space Centre and this 
company began to develop their own project for a 
two-staged heavy launch vehicle having no 
opportunities to derive any small launcher from it. 
However, in 1997, when the ‘Angara’ project was at 
the stage of Critical Design Review (CDR), the 
Khrunichev’s management decided to begin the 
development of quite a new concept of ‘Angara’ – a 
modular one. One of the reasons was an opportunity 
to create a whole family of various classes of 
launchers instead of only a single heavy launch 
vehicle. Besides the modular heavy ‘Angara’, 
significant attention was given to two versions of a 
small launcher, which received the ‘Angara-1’ 
designation. 
 
The two-staged ‘Angara-1’ was developed in two 
versions, ‘Angara-1.1’ and ‘Angara-1.2’, which 
differed in upper (second) stages. The first stage of 
both versions should be a single module of the heavy 
‘Angara’ first stage (it could be used either as a strap-
on booster or core module in the other versions of this 
heavy launcher). The module should use the 
oxygen/kerosene RD-191 rocket engine, a one-
chambered derivative of the ‘Energomash’s’ four-
chambered RD-170/171. 
 
The strength of the Angara project lies in this Unified 
Rocket Module, URM. With it, in a ‘pick-and-mix’ 
variety of options using a selection of well tried and 
proven technology for top-stages, the Angara family 
will complete very effectively (on a ‘level playing 
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field’ it would be fatally) with everything from Rokot 
(Angara 1.1) to Ariane 5 enhanced (Angara 5), Figure 
4. There are even completely reusable (not Shuttle 
style SRM) options developed for very good reasons, 
the chief being political/environmental rather than 
financial. An engineering pre-production prototype 
(not a wooden mock-up) was exhibited at the Le 
Bourget air show in 1991, Figure 5. 
 
The only thing that stops Khrunichev sweeping the 
world with all of this is their dire financial position, 
the associated poor state of the GEO COMSAT 
launching market and the usual Byzantine Russian 
politics and company practice. However, the 
relevance of the Angara family to GEO mini and 
small satellite launching should be obvious. For 
example Angara-3 is equivalent to Zenit-3, could be 
cheaper than, and may even be able to operate from, 
Zenit launch pads! 
 
Of all six launchers being discussed in this section, 
only Angara and perhaps Soyuz offer environmental 
cleanliness. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The ‘Angara’ family of launchers 
1 – ‘Angara-1.1’, 2 – ‘Angara-1.2’, 3 – ‘Angara-1VA’, 4 – ‘Angara-3 I’, 5 – ‘Angara-4 I’, 6 – ‘Angara-5 I’, 7 – 
‘Angara-4E’, 8 – ‘Angara-3SPG’, 9 – ‘Angara-4SPG’, 10 – ‘Angara-5SPG’, 11 – ‘Angara-5’, 12 – ‘Angara-7’
  (Khrunichev) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. The full-scale engineering mock-up of the ‘Baikal’ reusable fly-back booster at Le-Bourget in 2001 
(Khrunichev photo). 
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The last 3 dedicated GEO launchers are 
• all converted missiles ‘with tricks’ 
• all are close to realisation 
• all could offer a more ‘tailored’ option for 
minisatellites at prices which may go below $20 
m dollars US/launch 
• all are dependent on the remaining stocks of 
missiles and their condition 
• all are environmentally problematical and all will 
probably operate only from within the FSU 
 
Dnepr+Stages 
 
Dnepr [1, 2] based on the SS-18, is larger than Rokot 
and Strela which are based on SS-19. In its basic form 
it is cheaper than Rokot, which needs an especially 
constructed third stage (Breeze) to give it its 
admittedly very flexible performance. Dnepr 
outperforms Strela, a similarly ‘straight’ form of the 
SS-19 by a considerable margin. 
 
With the addition of a Self-Contained Booster Stage 
(SBS), probably to be derived from SS-24 
technology, Kosmotras (the marketing company) 
claim a capability of 300 kg to GEO. A reproduction 
of a recent brochure showing the SBS appears in 
Figure 6. Thus the Dnepr+stage(s) become a most 
interesting contender amongst the GEO launching 
alternatives. CST has been informed by Kosmotras 
that the SBS is proceeding for a particular contract, so 
prices and availability timescales are awaited with 
interest. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Dnepr payload accommodation showing SBS – (Kosmotras brochure). 
 
 
Rokot+stage+ion propulsion 
 
Under the auspices of ‘Eurockot’ Rokot has now 
begun a programme of LEO commercial launches for 
‘western’ small satellites. However, a completely 
internal (originally at least) programme of 
Khrunichev is attempting to develop a satellite bus 
called Yacht equipped with considerable ion 
propulsion capability with which to launch a plethora 
of proposed variants of two satellites also similarly 
equipped, ‘Monitor’ and ‘Dialogue’. Monitor is an 
LEO remote sensing satellite for which the ion 
propulsion is needed for tracking control (an 
engineering dummy was launched in June 2003 with 
a variety of microsatellites as a cluster) and Dialogue 
(described below) is a GEO small COMSAT for 
which ion propulsion is needed for both insertion and 
station-keeping. 
 
Khrunichev was hoping to surprise the world with an 
impressively cheap Rokot+Yacht with ion propulsion 
direct insertion of ‘Dialogue’ into GEO. Re-
assessments proved this to be impossible and now an 
extra stage must be added. In the meantime, a pair of 
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Dialogues are planned to be cluster-launched on 
Proton for tests. 
 
This method remains of serious interest and a variant 
of Dialogue is being built (whether ‘ion’ launched or 
not) as one of the contenders tendered to fulfil the 
Intersputnik-100M small satellite in GEO requirement 
issued in 2000 (see below). 
 
Strela+stage(s)+ion propulsion 
 
Strela would seem to be the least likely choice since, 
not only has it not flown but it comprises the ‘bare’ 
missile without the ‘Breeze’ upper stage. Its 
derivation, Figure 7, arises because NPO-M 
(Mashinostroyeniya) its sponsoring company was the 
central controlling company of the Chelomei empire 
of which Khrunichev was simply a part and now 
shares the rights to market or use the SS-19. 
 
The Strela will be test launched in the coming year 
from Baikonur, although launch facilities enabling SS 
orbits are being prepared at Svobodny. NPO-M needs 
Strela anyway to launch ‘Condor’, a remote sensing 
(mapping) satellite which is part of a ‘turn-key’ 
contract for the supply of cruise missiles (another 
NPO-M product). NPO-M may also have to supply a 
small GEO satellite which will be similar to the 
Ruslan-MM and it is also tendering (competitively 
with Khrunichev and NPO-PM, Krasnoyarsk, Siberia) 
for the Intersputnik-100M contract. 
 
Thus, the motive for NPO-M to devise a method to 
launch small satellites into GEO is clear, although the 
precise details of the system that they are developing 
have not yet been released. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. The evolution of the 'Rockot' ('POKOT') and 'Strela’' from the SS-19 (NPO-M). 
 
5. Mini and Small Satellite GEO Projects 
 
A brief description of four real mini/small GEO 
communication satellite projects, while not within the 
exact remit of a paper describing the methods of 
getting there, is included because designers or 
potential operators of such systems may be interested 
and encouraged to know that firm, established 
projects for real satellites exist. No doubt the 
processes of evolution will establish the final 
configuration that such satellites will take in the 
various mass classes, as it has done for ‘normal’ large 
GEO satellites. Even now, mass classes of around 
120, 400 and 800 kg seem to be emerging in 
conjunction with the distinctly different launch 
solutions of paired/dedicated, piggy-back and cluster. 
 
Gemini (GEostationary MINIsatellite) 
This test satellite series is being developed by SSTL. 
Initial funding was provided by the British 
government (BNSC) MOSAIC programme to sponsor 
small satellite initiatives (Topsat and DMC were 
others). However, the Nigerian Federal Ministry of 
Science and Technology is also providing some 
funding for GEMINI-1, shown in Figure 8, to be 
launched in 2005 and SSTL has won a tender to use 
the GEMINI bus as a test-bed for the GALILEO 
European navigation satellite system. Thus the project 
is well founded and follow-ons, GEMINI-2, 3, etc. 
are planned. 
 
To enable a wide variety of launch alternatives, the 
mass of GEMINI-1 is capped at 400 kg. Nevertheless 
it carries 6 transponders and has a planned life of at 
least 7 years. The launch, probably piggy-back with 
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an Express satellite is the subject of an inter-agency 
agreement between the BNSC and Rosaviacosmos 
and being arranged by CST in conjunction with CGSI 
(Centre for Ground Space Infrustructure Operations) 
and SSTL. Further information can be obtained from 
SSTL (who attend the AIAA/USU small satellite 
conferences regularly), or from the BNSC. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. GEMINI-1. 
 
The next 3 satellite projects 
• are all Russian 
• all, though delayed, stand a reasonable chance 
of being flown 
• all are being developed by reputable 
organisations for real reasons 
• are all heavily influenced by a tender for ( a 
large but indeterminate) number of small 
GEO communication satellites issued in 2000 
by Intersputnik, the Intersputnik-100M 
project 
 
The Intersputnik –100M project 
 
The details of this project were contained in the 
‘Intersputnik’ company’s brief announcement, which 
was published in 2001 in [3] and is cited below: 
 
‘Intersputnik has published additional details of its 
100M Project, which aims to develop a global fleet of 
small telecommunication satellites for domestic, 
regional and international communications and 
broadcasting networks. Information on the future use 
of Intersputnik’s 15 geostationary slots as well as 
plans for bi-directional Ku-/S-band Internet services 
under the project have also been revealed. 
 
Under current plans, four of the 15 slots would be 
used as ‘parking slots’ from which satellites can be 
dispatched to ‘operational slots’ on demand. The two 
western parking slots are 32.5 degrees and 23 
degrees West, serving the following five operational 
slots: 97, 83, 16, 6, and 3 degrees West. In the East, 
64.5 and 67.5 degrees East have been designated as 
parking slots. The six operational slots are 17, 27, 
59.5, 75, 114.5 and 153.5 degrees East. 
 
Intersputnik launched the project in November (see 
CST note below) to develop a new system of 
small/medium satellites and authorized the 
restructuring of its LMI joint venture as the 
organization defines its long-term strategy to serve 
international telecommunications markets. The 
project was initiated to enable the organization to 
take full advantage of the improvements in spacecraft 
design, while meeting the current and future 
requirements of the telecommunication market. 
 
“The new project – designated Intersputnik-100M – 
provides great possibilities for private investors with 
limited funds and for countries with average demand 
for the telecommunications traffic, which are willing 
to establish communications networks using their own 
satellites”, Intersputnik’s Director General Gennady 
Kudryavtsev said. 
 
In taking its decision, the Intersputnik board 
acknowledged that the current use of modern heavy 
satellites with many transponders is not always 
economically viable or efficient for regional and 
national communications networks with medium and 
small capacities. In these cases, a network of smaller 
capacity, lighter satellites would be very efficient. 
 
Intersputnik possesses extensive orbital resources, 
which consist of 5 geostationary orbital slots (from 
97º West to 153.5º East), where the organization has 
filed 51 satellite networks (15 C- and Ku-band and 36 
S-, Ka- and V-band) with the International 
Telecommunication Union. These slots will serve as a 
basis for the deployment of the prospective satellite 
communications system.’ 
G. Webb 17th Annual AIAA/USU 
 Conference on Small Satellites 
9
 
CST Note: 
 
Apparently the information on this project was given 
to the main Russian candidates for the Intersputnik 
tender much earlier than November 2000 since 
designs or mock-ups of prototypes of all three 
projects discussed below were exhibited by 1999. 
 
 
 
Express-AK 
 
The ‘Express-AK’ satellite is on the basis of the 
‘Express-1000’ space bus which was developed on a 
contract with the ‘Rosaviacosmos’, but further 
financing from the budget of the Agency is not 
foreseen in the Federal Space Plan (FKP-2005) 
covering the period to 2005. The spacecraft is shown 
in Figure 9 and packed for a ‘cluster launch’ (the 
most likely method) in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. The ‘Express-AK’ satellite. (NPO PM) 
 
The 'Express-1000' bus is an unusual development of 
NPO PM. (NPO PM, Prikladnoy Mechaniki was, 
before 1991 the monopoly supplier of communication 
satellites to the Soviet Union. It is now racing to 
improve its technology to address both growing 
internal competition and the world market.) Its project 
was developed on a contract with 'Rosaviacosmos' 
which had foreseen only the development of design 
documentation. The following realization of this 
project should be carried out with non-budget 
financing (see above). The mass of this bus should be 
600 kg while the total mass of the 'Express-AK' 
satellite on its base should be no more than 840 kg. 
Such geostationary communication satellites having 
10-12 transponders of C- and Ku-bands (depending 
on options) would be cheaper not only in their own 
cost price but also thanks to the opportunity to be 
launched by cheaper launch vehicles (for example, by 
the 'Rus' launcher instead of the 'Proton') or in 
clusters. While the project of 'Express-K' is being 
supported, by an inclusion into FKP-2005, as an 
attempt to achieve the current general level of 
Western satellites, the 'Express-1000' promises to be 
an advanced development in the field of small 
geostationary satellites. The lack of budget financing 
for the deployment of a satellite communication 
system on its base is explained, apparently, besides a 
general lack of money in the budget of 
'Rosaviacosmos', by a hope to win a tender 
announced by Vietnam for a communication satellite 
of similar type. The winning of this tender would 
allow not only the establishment of production and to 
test the satellite at the expense of a customer but also 
to gain money for the construction of other satellites 
for Russian needs. 
 
Dialog 
 
Khrunichev is developing a number of variants of its 
Dialog project (not just as a response to the 
Intersputnik ITT). An impression of the appearance of 
Dialog-E is shown in Figure 10. If the Rokot+ion 
propulsion method of insertion of this satellite cannot 
be readied before the satellites, then Khrunichev will 
cluster launch them with Proton if contractually 
obliged to do so. This option is not available for 
NPO-M for Ruslan-MM (see below) since it does not 
own the rights to any other launcher than Strela and 
would have to purchase the launches in a ‘hard’ 
market, against pressure from competitors.  
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Fig. 10. Artistic picture of the ‘Dialog-E’ satellite published in April 2001.  (Khrunichev) 
The characteristics of Dialog-E, which of course are subject to change are as follows: 
• Orbital slot 53.0º East Longitude 
• Accuracy of orbital position maintaining, deg.: 
     by inclination 0.1 
     by longitude 0.1 
• Mass of spacecraft in operation orbit in beginning of operation, kg 495 
• Mass of satellite’s payload, kg 59 
• No. of C and Ku band transponders 2 each  
   (can increase 2x for non ion insertion) 
• Lifetime of satellite without taking into consideration up to 10 
   the resource of propulsion system, years 
• Resource of propulsion system, years 5…7 
• Maximum error of satellite’s 6 
   coordinate axes attitude determination, angl. min 
• Power of solar arrays in beginning of operation, W 3900 
• Total impulse of propulsion unit, ton*s 300 
• Electric power consumption in operation 690 W max 
• Dimensions, mm: 
     height 2650 
     width in plane of solar arrays with folded solar arrays 2075 
     with unfolded solar arrays 15790 
     width in plane of PEM’s main antennas (in unfolded position) 2135 
• Time of transition from parking orbit to GEO, days 210 
• Launch vehicle ‘Rockot’ 
 
 
Ruslan-MM 
 
The first project for the ‘Ruslan-MM’ small 
communication satellite (‘MM’ means ‘Modified 
Small’ in Russian) was ready in early 1999 (a mock-
up of this satellite was shown at the MAKS-99 
Airshow in 1999). The main feature of this satellite 
was a capability to be injected by the ‘Strela’ small 
launcher into a parking orbit with a following transfer 
into GEO by its own on-board electric reaction 
propulsion unit (ERPU) (the same concept was laid 
down by Khrunichev into its ‘Yacht’ space bus 
project for geostationary/interplanetary spacecraft 
almost simultaneously). According to the project at 
that time, the ‘Ruslan-MM’ should have a mass in 
parking orbit of 620 kg and in GEO of 520 kg with 
the mass of payload 125 kg. 
Around the middle of 2001 a contract was signed for 
two Intersputnik-100M satellites and an improved 
Ruslan-MM was exhibited as a mock-up at the 
Moscow MAKS-2001 airshow in August 2001, 
Figure 11. The basic characteristics of the satellite 
given at that time are listed below. 
 
• Mass in orbit, kg 560 
• Mass of payload, kg 125 
• Power consumption by payload, W 1000 
• Accuracy of station keeping by 
latitude/longitude, deg. ±0.1 
• Time of injection into GEO, days 150 
• Life time, years 10-12 
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Fig. 11. Mock-up of the improved ‘Ruslan-MM’ shown at the MAKS-2001 Airshow in 2001. (CST photo) 
 
No information is yet to hand on the 2001 payload, 
but three options for the 1999 version listed either 12 
C-band, 6 Ku-band or 6C+3Ku band transponders 
with respective total power consumptions 800, 750 or 
820 Watts. The transmitted power output of C-band 
TWTs was 15 Watts and for Ku band 40 Watts. 
 
The likely difficulties with launching options for 
Ruslan-MM have been given above, but the 
necessities of contract obligations, when and where 
they exist, will drive NPO-M to find a way. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
An exciting new field for mini-satellites in GEO is 
opening up and some explorers are ‘boldly going’. 
Exactly what will happen is still unclear but the 
method and cost of access is the key, as for all other 
fields of space use. 
 
Some well founded projects, GEMINI, Express-AK, 
Dialog and Ruslan-MM lead the way and all are 
exploring innovative launching options with costs 
commensurate with satellite costs. The transponder 
quantity, type and power as a function of the mass 
and lifetime of the satellites will also be very 
important in deciding the winning designs. 
 
Regulatory factors and politics will of course play a 
role, apart from the engineering, in deciding whether 
a mini-satellite in GEO is worthwhile. Many new 
players could join and enrich the field of GEO 
communication satellites and it remains to be seen if 
their blossoming will be blighted by unfair play from 
the established giants. 
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